City University of New York (CUNY)

CUNY Academic Works
Student Theses

Baruch College

1-1-2015

Why Did Narendra Modi Win? Investigating whether religious
nationalist sentiment was responsible for one of the most
significant power shifts in Indian history
Abhinaya Swaminathan
Baruch College

How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
More information about this work at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/bb_etds/59
Discover additional works at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu
This work is made publicly available by the City University of New York (CUNY).
Contact: AcademicWorks@cuny.edu

Table of Contents
1. Acknowledgement……………………………………………………………………………………………… ii
2. Abstract…………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. iii
3. List of Abbreviations and Key Terms…………………………………………………………………... iv
4. Introduction……………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 1
a. The Puzzle –
Modi’s controversial rise to power…………………………………………………..…………. 3
b. The Argument –
How Modi won despite, not because of, his Hindu Nationalist past..…..………….. 5
c. The Research –
Literature Review and Methodology…………………………………………………………… 7
5. Incumbent Government’s Failures ………………………………………………………………….…. 11
a. Historical Context –
Origins of the current coalition government…….…………………………………..……. 11
b. Policy Paralysis –
UPA government’s failure to pass significant legislative measures……………….. 15
c. Impact on Modi’s Campaign –
Support of the middle class and the private sector……………………………………..... 20
6. Modi’s Rise to Leadership……………………………………………………………………………......... 24
a. Historical Context
Why the BJP brand had to be reshaped……………………………………………………... 24
b. Split from the old order –
Discord within the leadership and the breaking of old ties…………………………. 28
c. Modi’s leadership of a new BJP –
The right man for the party and the country……………………………………………. 32
7. Modi’s Campaign Strategy
a. A presidential-style campaign –
A contest of personalities, not parties……………………………………………………… 34
b. Handling the Media
Turning the focus away from dark history towards a brighter future…………. 39
8. Conclusion – Looking to the future…………………………………………………………………….. 45
9. Bibliography…………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 50

Acknowledgement
I would like to extend my sincere gratitude to Professor Myung-Koo Kang who has
afforded me with extraordinary patience and guidance while I was writing this thesis. His
willingness to ensure my success despite the fact that I missed deadline after deadline, and
to keep me focused on the task instead of getting distracted by secondary questions, had far
more to do with the successful completion of this thesis than my own efforts. I would also
like to thank Dr. Frank Heiland for working with me to ensure that this thesis would have
the chance to be reviewed. My two departmental readers, Professor Till Weber and
Professor Arianna Farinelli were very gracious in agreeing to read this thesis and I thank
them for their kind consideration. Finally, I would not have known where or how to start
without the ever helpful Keri Bertino and Heather Samples, whose commitment to guiding
honors thesis writers was a blessing that I could not have done without.

ii

Abstract
This thesis investigates the causes behind the Narendra Modi-led victory of the
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in the Indian general elections of 2014. The BJP won a
landslide victory against the incumbent United Progressive Alliance (UPA) coalition
government led by India’s oldest party, the Indian National Congress (INC). The landmark
power shift raised alarm in certain circles due to Modi’s controversial past, most notably
his alleged role in failing to prevent or stop the bloody religious riots that occurred in 2002
in Gujarat, during his tenure as Chief Minister of that state. His party, the BJP, has also long
been associated with right-wing Hindu nationalist groups. As a result, BJP’s victory,
particularly under the leadership of Modi, has caused concerns over whether Hindu
nationalism is gaining strength in the historically secular South Asian nation.
This thesis rejects the notion that rising Hindu nationalism was responsible for
Narendra Modi’s victory to argue that Modi’s rise to power can instead be attributed to two
things. First, the incumbent government’s ‘policy paralysis’, i.e., its inability to pass any
significant reform legislation, contrasted with Modi’s decisive, and therefore appealing,
style of leadership that promised a more efficient government. Second, Modi’s electoral
campaign strategy, which operated on two broad fronts, first, by making the election a
presidential-style personality contest, and second, by turning the political discourse away
from his murky past and towards his record of fostering economic development in Gujarat.
Far from being a sign of the rise of Hindu nationalist ideology in India, BJP’s victory in 2014
is thus indicative of a broader, and more secular, movement of Indian political winds
towards stronger leadership and the neoliberal economic policies embraced by Modi.
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List of Abbreviations and Key Terms
1.

BJP

: Bharatiya Janata Party, right-wing party with ties to Hindu
nationalist groups. Won the Indian general elections of 2014 by an
outright majority.

2.

INC

: Indian National Congress. India’s oldest political party established
well before the country’s independence. Historically part of the
ruling coalition at the center and loser of the 2014 general
elections.

3.

NDA

: National Democratic Alliance. Coalition formed under the
leadership of the BJP. Approximately center-right on the political
spectrum. Formed the government following the 2014 general
elections.

4.

RSS

: Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh. Right-wing Hindu nationalist
organization with close ties to militant Hindu groups.

5.

UPA

: United Progressive Alliance. Coalition led by the INC that formed
the government after the general elections of 2009.
Approximately center-left on the political spectrum and loser of
the 2014 elections.

6.

Economic
Voting

: Voting behavior that takes its cues primarily from how well the
economy is performing. The broad assumption here is that voters
will reward an incumbent government for presiding over a
healthy economy and punish it for presiding over a lackluster one.

7.

Hindu
Nationalism

: Nationalist sentiment that believes in the superiority of Hindu
religious culture, and in the identity of India as a Hindu nation.
The dominant form of Hindu nationalism in India is ‘Hindutva,’ the
philosophy adopted by the RSS.

8.

Veto Player

: A member of a coalition who has the ability to prevent a decision
from being made by threatening the withdrawal of their support
of the coalition.

9.

Parliamentary : A democratic system of government in which the executive and
Democracy
legislative functions are jointly vested in one body known as the
Parliament. The party or coalition that achieves the greatest
representation in Parliament forms the government and elects the
Head of Government, who is commonly given the title of either
Chancellor or Prime Minster. India is a parliamentary democracy.
Its current prime minister is Narendra Modi.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
When the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) won the 2014 general elections in India for
control of the lower house of Parliament, known as the ‘Lok Sabha ‘or the “people’s house,”
it secured 282 out of the 543 seats in that house (51.9%) to became the first party to win
these elections by an outright majority in three decades.1 Not only that, the 2014 elections
also witnessed the highest voter turnout in the history of these elections in India, with a
66.38% voter participation rate. The last time that a single party was given such an
overwhelmingly clear mandate by the Indian people was in 1984. At that time, the
country’s then Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi had just been assassinated. Her son, Rajiv
Gandhi, led the Indian National Congress (INC) party to a landslide victory by riding on a
sympathy wave during the subsequent elections, which had thus far held the record for
voter turnout at 64%.2
Usually, in Indian elections, a coalition of parties who have won enough seats
together to form a majority in the Parliament needs to come together to form the
government. This was the case in 2009, for example, when the INC formed a coalition of
parties named the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) who collectively had enough seats to
constitute a majority in the Lok Sabha. The BJP correspondingly had formed the National
Democratic Alliance (NDA) coalition, which had formed the main opposition to the
incumbent UPA government since 2009. As Table 1.1 presents below, comparing the
performance of the two major national parties, INC and BJP, as a percentage of the total
Election Commission of India, "Archive of General Election 2014: Performance of National Parties," Election
Commission of India, last modified 2014, http://eci.nic.in/eci_main/archiveofge2014/20%20%20Performance%20of%20National%20Parties.pdf.
2 Press Trust of India, "Highest Ever Turnout of 66.38% Recorded in this Lok Sabha Election," The Times of
India, May 12, 2014, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/news/Highest-ever-turnout-of-66-38-recorded-inthis-Lok-Sabha-election/articleshow/35028268.cms?.
1
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seat share of the coalitions that they head, the UPA and NDA respectively, in the general
elections of 2009 and 2014, shows why the BJP’s recent victory was of particular note:
Table 1.1
Party/ Coalition

Seats Won in 20143

Seats Won in 20094

INC/ UPA

44/ 59 (74.6%)

206/ 262 (78.6%)

BJP/ NDA

283/ 336 (84.2%)

116/ 159 (72.9%)

Table 1.1 shows that just the BJP’s seat share in 2014, at 283 seats, exceeded the
262 seats held by the entire UPA coalition which formed the government in 2009. Clearly,
the BJP has achieved a decisive victory in these most recent elections.
That the BJP achieved such a remarkable victory under the leadership of Narendra
Modi, one of India’s most controversial politicians, is especially interesting due to the
controversy surrounding the politician. The Human Rights Watch group, among other such
groups, has accused Modi of being complicit in the deadly 2002 Hindu-Muslim religious
riots that occurred in the Indian state of Gujarat, when he was Chief Minister of that state.5
Until very recently, Modi was prevented from entering the United States and some
European countries that had imposed a visa ban on the politician as a gesture of
condemnation for his government’s suspected abuse of human rights during the 2002 riots.
On the other hand, Modi has also won every election since 2002 to the office of Chief
Minister in Gujarat and has remained the darling of Indians who admired his ability to

Election Commission of India, “Archive of General Elections 2014.”
Election Commission of India, "Archive of General Elections 2009: Performance of National Parties," Election
Commission of India,
http://eci.nic.in/eci_main/archiveofge2009/Stats/VOLI/12_PerformanceOfNationalParties.pdf.
5 Smita Narula, "We Have No Orders to Save You: State Participation and Complicity in Communal Violence in
Gujarat," Human Rights Watch 14, no. 3 (April 2002), http://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/india/gujarat.pdf.
3
4
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bring outstanding economic development to the state of Gujarat. This dual perception of
Modi has made his rise to power an object of fascination to Indians and others alike.
Modi’s rise and the BJP’s victory were also set against the backdrop of a period of
sluggish economic growth in the world’s largest democracy, which many blamed on the
incumbent coalition government’s ‘policy paralysis.’ Although the UPA’s poor economic
performance appears to be the primary reason for why that coalition lost in 2014, the
concern over whether Modi’s victory means that his Hindu-nationalist affiliations have now
been endorsed by Indians is a legitimate one that is worth further study.
The Puzzle – Modi’s Controversial Rise to Power
Narendra Modi’s path to power started with the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh
(RSS), a volunteer right wing Hindu-nationalist organization that was originally set up in
1925 to unite the Hindu community during the Indian independence movement. The RSS
proclaims that its mission is to carry the nation to the pinnacle of glory and ensure the
protection of Hindu Dharma.”6 The organization promotes conservative Hindu-centric
values and believes in the identity of India as a Hindu nation. Modi became involved with
the RSS at a very young age, eventually rising to serve as a pracharak, or propagandist,
someone who lives in austerity to spread Hindu religious teachings, and recruit for the
cause of “Hindutva,” i.e., the philosophy of Hindu nationalism. He joined the political
offshoot of the RSS, the BJP, in 1987 and rose through the ranks of the party in a manner
that is, by all accounts, quite impressive and indicative of the greater things to come.7 In
2001, by showing great initiative in responding to a deadly earthquake that hit the Bhuj
"Welcome to RSS," Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, accessed May 5, 2015,
http://www.rss.org/knowus//Encyc/2014/8/22/Welcome-to-RSS.aspx.
7 Andy Marino, "The Early Years," in Narendra Modi: A Political Biography(HarperCollins Publisher India,
2014), Kindle edition.
6
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region of the Indian state of Gujarat, Modi was able to secure support to be the next chief
minister, i.e., the de facto head of each state government in India, of that state.8
Just a few short months into Modi’s term as the chief minister of Gujarat, in
February 2002, deadly religious riots occurred in the state. A train full of Hindu pilgrims, on
their way to help build a temple at the site of a former Mosque, caught on fire, resulting in
the death of 58 people. A Muslim mob was blamed for the incident at the time, but later
reports cast doubt on this claim.9 Hindu mobs turned on the state’s Muslims in retaliation,
and months of devastating violence, particularly noted for the occurrence of horrid rapes
and brutal killings, followed. Official accounts put the number of dead Muslims at a 1000
people, with over 20,000 Muslim homes, businesses, and places of worship destroyed, and
over 150,000 people displaced from their homes.10
Right from the start, there were suspicions over whether the state’s Narendra Modiled BJP government somehow aided or otherwise encouraged the Hindu rioters. These
suspicions worsened when police did nothing to control the thousands of angry Hindu
mobsters on the day after the train fire.11 Senior officials in Modi’s administration spoke to
the press and to investigators on the condition of anonymity and based on their testimony,
it was alleged that Modi had met with members of his administration during the early days
of the riots and instructed police officials to “allow Hindu rioters to vent their anger against

Ross Colvin and Satarupa Bhattacharjya, "Special Report: The Remaking of Narendra Modi," Reuters, July 12,
2013, xx, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/12/us-india-modi-idUSBRE96B02320130712.
9 Celia W. Dugger, "Fire Started on Train Carrying Hindu Activists Kills 58,"The New York Times, February 28,
2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2002/02/28/world/fire-started-on-train-carrying-hindu-activists-kills58.html.
10 Celia W. Dugger, "Religious Riots Loom Over Indian Politics," The New York Times, July 27, 2002,
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/07/27/international/asia/27INDI.html?.
11 Ibid.
8
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Muslims.”12 In a scathing report titled “We Have No Orders to Save You,” the Human Rights
Watch group detailed the accusations against the Modi government, alleging that the state’s
law enforcement officers were deliberately ordered to not stop the riots.13 Modi’s
supporters and human rights groups have fought bitterly ever since to settle the truth or
falsehood of these accusations.
Eventually, a Special Investigations Team set up by the Supreme Court of India
cleared Modi of any wrongdoing with regards to the riots in 2012.14 Modi himself has, since
2002, turned all of his focus on making Gujarat an economic powerhouse and maintained
his distance from radical, or at least violent, Hindu nationalism. He was reelected as
Gujarat’s chief minister for three successive terms, even carrying the vote of a significant
portion of the state’s Muslims. His victories have mainly been attributed to his
administration’s superior management of the state’s economy, which has made the state of
Gujarat grow at a faster pace than the rest of the country and led to the coining of the term,
“Modi-nomics.”15
However, questions have remained regarding Modi’s ties to Hindu extremism,
casting a shadow upon his eventual victory and rise to the office of Prime Minister in 2014.
This thesis addresses whether or not Hindu nationalist sentiment was the reason for
Modi’s victory, and consequently, whether India is turning away from the strong secular
tradition it has held ever since its Independence from the British Empire and Partition from
the Islamic nation of Pakistan in 1947.
Manu Joseph, "Shaking off the Horror of the Past in India," The New York Times, February 15, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/16/world/asia/16iht-letter16.html.
13 Narula, “We Have No Orders to Save You,” 2002.
14 Ibid.
15 "The Gujarat Model: How Modi-nomics was forged in one of India's most business friendly states," The
Economist, January 10, 2015, http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21638147-howmodi-nomics-was-forged-one-indias-most-business-friendly-states.
12
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The Argument - How Modi won despite, not because of, his Hindu Nationalist past
In this thesis, I argue that Modi’s victory primarily resulted from two factors: first,
the incumbent government’s failures contrasted with Modi’s show of strong leadership
within his party, and second, Modi’s savvy campaign strategy, which operated by turning
the election into a presidential-style contest and by turning the discourse away from Modi’s
controversial past and towards his excellent economic track record in Gujarat.
The incumbent government’s ‘policy paralysis,’ i.e., its inability to pass any
significant reform legislation because of gridlock within the coalition was a major focus of
the electoral discourse leading up to 2014. The failure of important economic reform
legislation to pass through parliament, combined with highly publicized scandals and
messy divides within the coalition, left the incumbent government vulnerable to credible
attack by the Modi campaign.
Modi’s decisive leadership style had a strong appeal to the Indian electorate. As
leader of the BJP, Modi made a firm and highly visible break from the party’s old order to
set himself up as the head of a reformed, economic-growth and good-governance oriented
“new” BJP. His management of the party also served as a metaphor for the kind of efficient
government that he was promising to the Indian people.
Finally, Modi’s campaign strategy was successful by operating on two broad fronts.
First, it turned the elections into a presidential-style personality contest, something that is
unusual in Indian politics, where the norm is for parties and ideologies to clash against
each other. This worked in Modi’s favor because his opponent for the post of Prime
Minister, INC’s Rahul Gandhi, was ill equipped to match Modi’s charismatic persona.
Second, the campaign directed discourse away from Modi’s murky past as related to his

6

alleged involvement in the 2002 Gujarat riots, and towards his record of fostering strong
economic growth as Chief Minister of his state, Gujarat. His ‘Ache Din’, or ‘Good Days’
campaign strategy united different sections of the Indian population under the common
banner of economic growth.
The Research
Literature Review
I primarily refer to the work of Mira Debs, a junior fellow at Yale’s Center for
Cultural Sociology, to understand the historical context within which the two major
national parties in India, the INC and the BJP, developed their identities as supporters of
secularism and Hindu nationalism, respectively. In an article written for Nations and
Nationalism, a journal of the Association for the Study of Ethnicity and Nationalism, Debs
writes about how, “cultural traumas are advanced by carrier groups with clear interests at
stake including political or material gain, artistic expression, collective processing or group
identification.”16 Carrier groups here refers to groups that are in power and may include
categories as varied as politicians, journalists, and artists. These carrier groups often
construct and deploy “cultural trauma narratives” which, according to Debs, “must be
authentically resonant with a mass public” in order to be successful in creating a powerful
nationalist sentiment that benefits the group in question.17 This explains how the INC,
which was in a powerful position during India’s Independence from the British Empire in
1947, was able to advance its image as a force for secularism by shaping the narrative of
the traumatic events that occurred during the struggle for independence.

Mira Debs, "Using cultural trauma: Gandhi's assassination, partition and secular nationalism in postindependence India," Nations & Nationalism 19, no. 4 (October 2013): 637. doi: 10.1111/nana.12038.
17 Ibid.
16
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Political scientist George Tsebelis’ veto player analysis of Western European
parliamentary systems is also applicable to this thesis. Tsebelis work helps us understand
why a country such as India, which has a parliamentary democracy, can experience
political gridlock. In parliamentary democracies, the executive and legislative functions of
government are jointly vested in Parliament, as opposed to systems where a legislative
assembly and a president handle these functions separately. The parliamentary system
thus seems to be more efficient. However, combining this system with a multi-party
democracy leads to the creation of coalition governments, where the coalitions so-formed
may not always be ideologically united. The dynamics within such coalitions can lead to
gridlock and inefficiencies, as described by Tsebelis’ ‘veto player theory.’
In his book, “Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work” (2002), Tsebelis uses
data gathered on eighteen Western European parliamentary governments to find that there
is a negative correlation between the number of “veto players” in a coalition government
and the number of significant policy reforms passed by that government.18 Veto players
are defined as the members of a coalition who have the ability to prevent a choice from
being made through the threat of the withdrawal of their support of the coalition. Tsebelis
finds that, as the number of veto players in coalition increases, the ability of that coalition
to make significant changes to the status quo decreases. A coalition government with a
large number of veto players will thus find it harder to implement significant legislative
changes. This effect is exacerbated by the presence of large ideological differences amongst

George Tsebelis, "Governments and Parliaments," In Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work, New
York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2002.
18

8

the members of the coalition government. Tsebelis concludes, “Many veto players with big
ideological distances between them means that legislation can only be incremental.”19
Methodology
This thesis relied on a close reading of literature related to nationalism theory,
coalition dynamics, parliamentary democracies, Indian history, and neoliberal economic
theory to understand the circumstances of Modi’s rise to power as the Prime Minster of
India. The work of nationalism theorists and Indian political historians informed my
analysis of the unique historical circumstances in India which made the 2014 general
elections worthy of further investigation. The work of political scientist George Tsebelis in
analyzing gridlock situations in parliamentary democracies informed my findings about
why the incumbent UPA government became gridlocked and ineffective.
The bulk of my analysis was conducted through the study of hundreds of newspaper
and magazine articles, both from Indian and international news outlets. Notably, I followed
the media coverage of Modi’s campaign through articles in newspapers such as The Times
of India, The Hindu, and The New York Times, and magazines such as Time and The
Economist. Political theory was adapted to understand events as they unfolded in news
articles, with the result being that Modi’s campaign activities and the corresponding media
responses could be categorized into the two broad strategies detailed above. News media
coverage of the campaign is thus used to show how Modi was able to preside over one of
the most historic power shifts in the world’s largest democracy by focusing on the
incumbent government’s failures, setting himself up as an effective leader, and directing
the electoral discourse in his favor.

19

Tsebelis,"Governments and Parliaments," In Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work, 99-100.
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In the following pages I will set out to support my argument in three separate but
linked chapters. Chapter 2, titled “Incumbent Government’s Failures” deals primarily with
the gridlock and divisions within the UPA coalition that caused it to become ineffective and
lose favor with the Indian electorate. I show why the UPA was blamed for India’s slowing
economic growth by providing an overview of how significant reform on two key economic
issues failed to pass parliament due to the veto player dynamics within the UPA coalition.
Chapter 3, titled “Modi’s Rise to Leadership” explores the creation of Modi’s image
as an effective leader. Modi’s highly visible and controversial split from the BJP’s old order
is detailed and analyzed to show how he benefited from being seen as the face a “new” BJP.
Chapter 3 should also be understood within the context of Chapter 2. The policy paralysis
of the UPA coalition was particularly vulnerable to attack by the Modi campaign because of
how he had shown himself to be an effective and efficient leader.
In Chapter 4, titled “Modi’s Campaign Strategy,” I show how Modi’s campaign was
successful by adopting two broad strategies. First, the campaign turned the elections into a
presidential-style personality contest by attacking Rahul Gandhi’s status as the heirapparent to the politically affluent Gandhi dynasty and portraying Modi, in contrast, as a
self-made man who had ‘earned’ his position. Second, by consistently reinforcing Modi’s
economic track record, the campaign was able to side-step Modi’s Hindu nationalist past.
In conclusion, I look to India’s future. I argue that, although it is yet too early to
know whether Modi can deliver on his promise of a better economic future for India, it is
already clear that his campaign has fundamentally changed the dynamics of elections in the
country. It has brought concrete change to Indian politics, which has relied, perhaps for too
long, on Independence-era discourse.

10

Chapter 2: Incumbent Government’s Failures
In one important way, the UPA government’s resounding loss in 2014, when it went
from holding 202 seats in 2009 to merely 44 in 2014, was entirely predictable. The
coalition had become gridlocked and unable to pass legislation that was seen as necessary
to improve India’s economy. Given that the country was experiencing slower economic
growth and high inflation, public sentiment turned against the incumbent government,
particularly when that government was seen to be inefficient and unable to function. Key to
understanding the UPA’s loss is the theory of economic voting, which holds that voters will
punish an incumbent government for a poorly performing economy. This theory helps
explain why the UPA’s chances going into the 2014 elections on the heals of lackluster
growth and double digit inflation were not very good to begin with. The UPA’s problems
were then compounded because it was faced with a challenger who was able to capitalize
effectively on its failures.
The ‘policy paralysis’ of the UPA coalition, which was perceived as the root cause of
India’s poor economic performance, benefitted the Modi campaign by first turning public
sentiment away from the incumbent government due to the ‘economic voting’ behavior
detailed above and second, by setting the BJP up as a preferable alternative to not just the
INC, but the UPA as a whole. This is the primary reason for the BJP’s landslide victory in
2014, when it won by an outright majority. Further, this shows that the electorate’s
dissatisfaction with the UPA government was not fueled by a preference for a Hindu
nationalist government, but rather by the UPA coalition’s perceived ineffectiveness in
managing India’s economy.

11

Historical Context – Origins of the UPA Coalition
Historically, the INC has been overwhelmingly more successful in gaining control of
the government in India. The party, either on its own or through a coalition, has been in
power at the center for a total of 49 out of the 67 years since India’s independence from the
British Empire in August 1947. The party’s success is largely attributable to its being
credited with leading India to Independence and then building on the momentum of that
credit to consolidate power over the long-term. The first prime minister of India after
independence, Jawaharlal Nehru, belonged to the INC and the party has since contributed
six other prime ministers to the Indian government, with many of them serving multiple
terms.20 The INC was continuously in power on its own strength from Independence until
1977, and then again between 1980 and 1989. It governed through coalition between 1991
and 1995, and once again between 2005 and 2014, at which time the Modi-led BJP party
defeated the INC-led UPA coalition. It is important to note that, other than the INC, the only
other party to have won by an outright majority during any election in India’s entire
history since Independence is the BJP, which was only able to achieve such a feat in 2014.
Over this time period, the INC’s economic policies have changed considerably.
Having been in power so often, the INC has naturally had a defining role in the shaping of
the modern Indian economy. Under India’s first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, the
party endorsed socialist economic policies, a legacy which followed the party for quite
some time afterwards. The INC’s mission statement calls for the establishment of a

"Former Prime Ministers," Prime Minister of India, accessed May 5, 2015,
http://pmindia.gov.in/en/former-prime-ministers/.
20
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“Socialist State based on Parliamentary Democracy” in India.21 However, these socialist
policies, which were most strongly implemented under the prime minister-ship of
Jawaharlal Nehru and his daughter Indira Gandhi (incidentally also periods of
extraordinarily slow economic growth in India), have steadily moved more towards the
center in recent years. In fact, in 1991, the INC led India to economic liberalization, which
laid the foundation for the repaid period of double-digit growth that India experienced a
decade ago. Interestingly, the finance minister of the country at the time, who was
responsible for implementing the liberalization measures, was Dr. Manmohan Singh. Dr.
Singh was also the prime minister of the UPA government, in a sign of the dissociation
between what the UPA must have known to be the right economic policy direction and
what it ended up implementing.
The INC’s monopoly on being the one party that speaks for all of India at a national
level has also loosened in recent years, leading the party to rule mainly through coalition in
the recent past. The party like all major national parties has increasingly relied on the
support of regional parties to constitute a majority in parliament. National parties such as
the INC and the BJP represent broad umbrella positions that they are not able to fit to the
needs of every single region. National parties usually agree to form coalitions before the
elections, and sometimes before even the campaigning begins, and “share” some
constituencies with various regional parties. While the national party is expected to win the
most seats within the coalition, the regional parties play the important role of capturing
seats that cannot be reached by the national party. These regional parties are usually
formed along communal lines and may often have key ideological differences with the
"Indian National Congress," Indian National Congress, accessed May 3, 2015, http://www.inc.in/aboutcongress/mission.
21
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party leading their coalition. As such, coalitions are always negotiated into place, not
assumed automatically due to ideological similarity.
The UPA coalition was originally created in 2004. The below table shows its original
composition, along with the respective number of Members of Parliament (MPs) from each
party:
Table 2.1
Party22

MPs23

State(s)24

Indian National Congress (INC)

146

National

Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD)

23

Bihar & Jharkand

Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK)

16

Tamil Nadu

Nationalist Congress Party (NCP)

10

National

Pattali Makkal Katchi (PMK)

6

Tamil Nadu

Telangana Rashtra Samithi (TRS)

5

Andhra Pradesh

Jharkand Mukti Morcha (JMM)

5

Jharkhand

Marumalarchi Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (MDMK)

4

Tamil Nadu

Lok Jan Shakti Party (LJS)

4

Bihar

Kerala Congress

2

Kerala

Indian Union Muslim League (IUML)

1

Kerala

Jammu & Kashmir People’s Democratic Party

1

Jammu & Kashmir

Republican Party of India

1

Maharashtra

All India Majlis-e-Ittehadul Muslimen

1

Andhra Pradesh

As Table 2.1 shows, the coalition was composed mainly of regional parties, although
each regional party had only a few seats. It was a reality of the UPA government in 2004

India times News Network, "United Progressive Alliance: Partners in Government," The Times of India, July
8, 2006, xx, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/home/specials/United-Progressive-Alliance-Partners-ingovernance/articleshow/1716941.cms.
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that all of these parties were needed to form government. In addition, the outside support
of the Left Front was also needed in order to pass legislation since the coalition by itself fell
short of a majority with only 225 seats (41.4% of a total 543).
In 2009, the second iteration of this coalition, i.e., UPA – II, was formed. UPA – II was
actually in a better position than UPA – I. Although the coalition had since lost the support
of the Left Front, the Republican Party of India, MDMK, and PMK, UPA – II actually held 262
seats in parliament after the 2009 elections bringing it closer to majority by pushing its
seat share to 48.3% out of the total 543.25 The coalition did this with the help of new
members, the Trinamool Congress (18 MPs) and the Bodoland People’s Front (1 MP). The
coalition, both times, was broadly Center-Left in ideology, although ideological unity was
never one of its strong points. Some parties in the coalition, such as the DMK, had
previously been a part of the NDA coalition when it was in power, indicating that their
alliance with the INC was less based on common ideology than on striking a bargain to stay
in power.
Policy Paralysis
Two key economic policy issues demonstrate the policy paralysis of the Congressled United Progressive Alliance government. Reforms in the fields of labor laws and natural
resource allocation have long been identified as necessary to India’s sustained economic
growth. The World Bank has been among the leading critics of the UPA’s policy. More
tellingly, both the Indian political right and left have disavowed the UPA’s so-called “pro-
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poor” policies for simultaneously hurting corporate interests while failing to help the very
population that the laws were created to protect.
India’s labor laws were a relic of British colonial rule, and included several archaic
policies such as requiring companies with over a hundred employees to obtain government
permission before firing workers. In theory, these laws were designed to protect workers’
rights. However, the strict and complicated labor regulations led to declined investment by
companies in key sectors such as manufacturing and retail. This has resulted in the creation
of a large informal labor sector in India, which is harmful not only because of the lost
potential for economic growth but also because informal workers received little to no
protection from the existing labor laws. 26 Further, even when labor is not informal, there is
evidence to show that this policy has hurt the very population that it was designed to
protect by discouraging firms from hiring during an economic uptake, reducing the
flexibility of Indian labor to negotiate independent contracts, and the implementation of
subversive tactics by management of large to break up unions in an effort to reduce the
number of employees.27
The problems with existing labor policy had come to light long before Modi or the
BJP ever took to the stage to criticize the UPA. A survey conducted between July 2009 and
July 2010, by the National Sample Survey Office (NSSO), for example, reported that only
200,000 jobs were created annually during the UPA’s first term between 2004 and 2009, in
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contrast with 12 million jobs during the NDA government’s rule.28 Even the Left Front,
which should have been a natural ally of the UPA’s left-leaning policies and which in fact
was part of the UPA coalition when it was originally formed criticized the coalition’s policy
by calling it “a policy of deception,” for the frustratingly contradictory impact that it was
having.29 However, despite early identification of the problem, the UPA was not able to
enact the needed major reforms throughout its five-year term.
Natural resource allocation is a highly politicized issue in India. Particularly under
the UPA government, burdensome bureaucratic procedures were accompanied by rampant
corruption, leading to the stalling or cancellation of several major projects. The infamous
“Coalgate” scandal exemplified this type of resource misallocation. Under UPA rule, the
government granted rights to various ‘coal blocks,’ or mining rights to parcels of coal-rich
land, to private firms through a ‘no-bid’ process for prices far below the actual value of
these resources, with the resulting loss in revenue estimated to be around $33 billion.30
The Indian Supreme Court recently ruled that these allocations had been carried out
against public interest and nullified the rights of private interests to coal blocks that were
granted to them under UPA rule. Similarly, between 2007 and 2010, an estimated $29
billion in revenue was lost when the telecom ministry under UPA rule corruptly
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undercharged mobile telephone companies for frequency allocation licenses31. This ‘2G
Spectrum’ scandal, as it was known, was a source of major embarrassment for the UPA. The
Supreme Court of India, in this case as well, quashed the licenses that had been granted to
telecommunications companies during the UPA’s tenure.32
The ‘Coalgate’ and ‘2G Spectrum’ scandals touched on issues of both bureaucratic
inefficiency and corruption resulting from lack of transparency. In both these cases, the
Congress party took the brunt of the blame for the UPA government’s failures, and
disagreements within the coalition became more pronounced. The resulting dysfunctional
central government further weakened confidence of private interests, who were already
experiencing major setbacks due to the mass cancellation of improperly issued licenses. In
a 2014 interview with BBC News, World Bank Chief Economist Kaushik Basu, while
remaining optimistic about India’s long term prospects, endorsed the view that “policy
paralysis” and “poor governance” had played a major role in the slowdown of economic
growth that India seemed to be experiencing in the past couple of years.33 Precisely at the
time when reform of the so-called “license raj,” referring to India’s corrupt and complicated
system of issuing licenses, was needed, the central government was unable to deliver.
This ‘policy paralysis’ of the UPA government can be explained by looking at the
composition and dynamics of the coalition government. First, the coalition, and particularly
the INC, did not have the strength in parliament to effectively direct legislative agenda.
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Second, the coalition was not very ideologically united, leading to difficulties in enacting
sweeping policy measures that all members could agree on.
Political Scientist George Tsebelis’ findings appear to be borne out in the experience
of the UPA government in India between 2009 and 2014. The UPA coalition held 262 seats
after the 2009 election results, of a total of 543 elected seats in Parliament. The coalition
was headed by the Indian National Congress, which held 206 seats.34 The government thus
lacked the simple majority of 272 seats required to pass legislative measures without the
support of independent parties outside of the coalition. Further, the coalition-forming
party, the Indian National Congress (INC) lacked the simple majority required to effectively
set the legislative agenda even within the coalition. As such, the UPA government was
unable to pass the kind of sweeping economic reform measures needed to combat the
structural macroeconomic problems of a country still in the process of implementing the
liberalization measures that were only introduced in 1991.
Further, the Centre-Left ideological stance of the UPA coalition was forged together
from a wide range of ideological positions held by its members, where the only uniting
factor amongst them appears to be a common distrust of the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya
Janata Party (BJP). When the coalition was originally formed in 2004, the member parties
agreed to a “Common Minimum Programme,”35 which was meant to establish a few
minimum points of cooperation within the coalition despite the clearly acknowledged
policy differences amongst the membership.
"Key Highlights." In Archive of General Elections 2009. Vol. 1. New Delhi: Election Commission of India,
2009.
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The coalition was always in danger of falling apart at the slightest provocation. For
example, in 2008, the Left Front party decided to withdraw support from the UPA when its
ideological differences with Congress became untenable after the India-United States Civil
Nuclear Agreement was signed. The Left Front was opposed to the agreement and
withdrew its support from the coalition, intentionally triggering a vote of confidence
measure in Parliament. The remaining members, led by Congress, narrowly survived the
vote of confidence and proved their majority, but not without becoming embroiled in
another scandal, this time being accused of attempting to bribe Members of Parliament for
their votes. Even though the legitimacy of the vote of confidence was ultimately preserved,
it appeared that the UPA’s Centre-Left “Common Minimum Programme” had fallen apart.
As the alliance amongst the political parties who were opposed to the BJP fell apart, the BJP
began to appear as an increasingly viable alternative to lead the central government.
Impact on Modi’s campaign
The gridlock and corruption scandals of the UPA government were tied with poor
economic performance of the country. India began experiencing a period of slower
economic growth since 2012, with every economic forecast attributing the slowdown to
the perceived gridlock in the INC-led UPA government.
Below charts illustrate economic growth and inflation over the period from 2000 –
2014. As chart 2.1 above shows, India began experiencing a slowdown of economic growth
during the UPA’s second term between 2009 and 2014. Although there were brief spikes in
economic growth, the overall trend of less than 6% annual growth seemed quite
unimpressive, particularly for a country that seeks to lay claim to China’s title of the most
impressive developing economy in the world. Particularly when combined with consumer
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price inflation that spiked to the double digits under the UPA’s governance (see Chart 2.2),
the economic performance of the country seemed sorely misguided.
Chart 2.136

Chart 2.237

This was bad news for the UPA since, India’s parliamentary democracy system is
particularly susceptible to the phenomenon of “economic voting,” i.e., voting behavior,
either in favor or against the incumbents, that is tied to economic performance of the state.
Researchers have long noted that, “greater clarity of responsibility facilitates economic
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voting and therefore electoral accountability.”38 Since Parliament holds both legislative and
de facto executive power in India, the electorate is able to clearly tie economic performance
of the country to actions of the incumbent in that body. This can be contrasted with a
presidential system of government, such as the one in the United States, where the
President and Congress share responsibility for government and it may not always be
possible to blame one branch over the other for the economy's poor performance. For the
UPA, this meant that the blame for India’s slowing economic growth and high inflation
landed squarely at the coalition’s door.
Modi’s campaign was keenly aware of the UPA government’s perceived policy
paralysis and its consequent mismanagement of the economy. One of Modi’s key campaign
themes focused on this oft-repeated phrase: “Less Government, More Governance.” The
politician’s autobiographer, Andy Marino, who followed the candidate closely on the
campaign trail notes that Modi consistently focused on “the reform of political institutions,
and the relationship between citizens and the state.” Mr. Marino further states that the
Modi campaign positioned the election as, “a choice between reform and empowerment on
the one hand, and retrenchment and entitlement on the other.”39 This is in reference to the
Center-Left politics of the INC, which has historically believed in the welfare state,
especially for minorities. The emerging middle class population in India, along with other
domestic and private foreign interests, were thus particularly receptive of Modi’s campaign
against the traditional, big government and heavy regulation policies of the UPA
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government, particularly at a time when the INC appeared unable to carry out even its
stated policy objectives.
The second effect that the incumbent government’s failures had was to make the BJP
the primary alternative to the entire UPA coalition. This is evident in the way that the BJP
was able to win seats away from not only Congress, which is the party that is usually in
direct contention with the BJP, but also from several regional parties which had hitherto
only been in competition with other regional parties.40 For example, in the nation’s capital,
New Delhi, BJP won all nine seats, defying expectations that the hugely popular regional
grassroots party originating in Delhi, the Aam Aadmi Party (APP) would win at least two or
three seats.41 The BJP in 2014 thus became the first party since 1984 to win the general
elections by an outright majority, a clear sign if any that the country was moving away from
the problems posed by electing multiple regional parties to form coalition governments.
Every such setback of the UPA government thus directly translated into a victory for
the BJP. By directly positioning themselves as a united front against the alleged Hindu
fanaticism of the BJP, the coalition members ended up setting the stage for BJP’s singlehanded, landslide victory in 2014. As macroeconomic problems worsened and successive
corruption scandals rocked the central government, the BJP’s controversial involvement
with Hindu nationalist parties became a secondary concern. The dysfunctional and
inefficient coalition government stripped each of the individual member parties of their
respective regional political influence, and transferred it en masse to a single national party
i.e., the BJP.
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Chapter 3: Modi’s Rise to Leadership
Modi’s rise to the leadership of the BJP needs to be understood within the historical
context of the Indian political tradition. The identities of the INC and the BJP as the secular
and Hindu nationalist parties, respectively, have played a key role in how these parties are
perceived within and outside of India’s borders. Modi not only faced the burden of his own
controversial past, he also had to work with the BJP’s association, as a whole, with
Hindutva ideology. He dealt with this problem by making a highly visible break from the
BJP’s old order and then assuming leadership of a new BJP. This split from the old order
allowed Modi to reshape the BJP’s brand and also to forge his identity as a strong leader.
Modi’s image as an effective leader was a key component of his campaign in 2014. In
large part, Modi relied on his track record of running an efficient administration in Gujarat
to craft the narrative of his strong leadership skills. After all, his administration had won
reelection every time. Business leaders and young Gujaratis in particular had long
supported Modi for the way he “took charge” of Gujarat’s economy to make the state one of
the most investor friendly regions in the nation.42 The incumbent government’s ‘policy
paralysis’ was particularly vulnerable to the image that Modi presented of himself to the
Indian electorate.
Historical Context – Origins of the INC/BJP Divide
The central political divide in the 2014 general elections in India can be traced back
to the time of the country’s independence from British rule in 1947. Sectional tensions
between Muslims, Hindus, and Sikhs had reached a dangerous peak at the time due to the
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debate over whether the former British colony should be partitioned into two new
countries, secular India and Islamic Pakistan. Ultimately, the worsening of religiously
motivated violence, and the efforts of British colonial officials and prominent Indian
politicians who favored a two-state solution to the religious divide precipitated in the
partition of the country. Partition resulted in the retributive genocide of an estimated one
million people and the forced migration of an estimated six to fifteen million people away
from their homes.43 Territorial dispute over the border region of Jammu & Kashmir
between Pakistan and India persists to this day leading to brief and not-infrequent bursts
of violence at the border. Partition, and the associated religious divide, has thus
significantly informed Indian cultural and political consciousness since the days of
independence.
The debate over Partition at the time of India’s independence, and the concurrent
assassination of the foremost leader of the Independence movement, Mahatma Gandhi,
established two distinct Indian political traditions. The first, adopted by the Indian National
Congress (INC) and endorsed by Mahatma Gandhi, promoted a secular India with
aggressive affirmative action measures to protect and support minorities in a country that
is overwhelmingly Hindu. The second, a conservative and Hindu-nationalist position, was
first adopted by the grassroots volunteer organization, the Rashtriya Swayamvasevak
Sangh (RSS), and later popularized by the RSS’ more mainstream political offshoot that was
established in 1980, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP).
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INC’s strength as the most successful party in Indian history is often attributed to
the Indian people’s strong identification with a secular tradition. Mira Debs of Yale
University’s Center for Cultural Sociology finds that Gandhi’s assassination in 1948 was key
to developing both India’s and the INC’s identification with secularism. She points out that
this traumatic event “was immediately embraced by Congress party politicians who used
the assassination to reinforce the idea of a unified secular nation.”44 The INC emphasized
the fact that Gandhi’s assassin, Nathuram Godse, was a member of a Hindu extremist group.
This allowed them to show the Hindu majority nation that Muslims were not the enemy,
religious extremism was. The INC was not the sole group that tried to emphasize
secularism in India following Gandhi’s assassination. British colonial officials and leading
news outlets also embraced this narrative.45 However, because the INC was in power and in
charge of crafting this narrative against religious extremism, the party itself became
inextricably linked with India’s secular and unified identity
The INC has rigorously maintained its secular image since Independence. The
party’s official website quotes its President, Mrs. Sonia Gandhi, from her speech during the
125th anniversary celebrations of the party, as saying, “The Indian National Congress has
always represented a secular, democratic, just, and inclusive India.”46 The placement of the
adjective “secular” ahead of all the others is not accidental. The implicit promise that the
INC makes to the Indian electorate is that it can be a guardian of the nation’s secular
identity. Building on the momentum of its role during and just after Independence, and on
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the successful creation of the secular-India narrative, the INC has since almost acquired the
status of being the default ruling party at the center.
The RSS fell on the other side of that image divide. The fact that Gandhi had been
assassinated by a former RSS member and a Hindu, did not stop the RSS from fueling antiMuslim sentiment after the incident by turning the blame towards that community and
calling for a Hindu-nationalist India in contrast to the Islamic Pakistan. In the process of
creating a secular identity for India following Gandhi’s assassination, the INC government
under Nehru actually banned Hindu nationalist groups including the RSS and arrested
about 20,000 members of such organizations. Those arrested in this manner were only
released eight months later, after “they agreed to give up violence and pledge allegiance to
the Indian constitution and flag.”47 This indicates that the INC’s narrative of its own secular
identity, from the very beginning, included the demonization of Hindu nationalist groups.
Since the BJP eventually was an offshoot of the RSS, it has had to carry this legacy of
violence and anti-Indian sentiment that the INC encouraged the nation to associate Hindu
nationalists with.
Although the INC has since had its own problems with being associated with
communal tensions, most notably during the INC-sponsored actions against the Sikh
community following the assassination by a Sikh guard of the party’s leader and the
country’s then prime minister, Indira Gandhi, in 1984, the party still retains claim to its
carefully developed identity as a supporter of secularism and protector of minority groups.
The BJP, by contrast, is permanently associated with Hindu nationalism and anti-Muslim
sentiment due to its close ties to the outspoken Rashtriya Swayamvasevak Sangh (RSS).
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Further, the BJP’s identity as a Hindu nationalist party has prevented it from being a truly
equal political opponent to the INC.
As things stood just before the general elections in 2014, this political divide still
seemed firmly established, although circumstances of both parties had changed since the
days of Independence. Unlike in 1947, the INC was no longer the sole dominant power at
the center in 2014, having been forced in the previous general election to rule through a
hobbled-together coalition. In recent years the secularist image which has been the INC’s
greatest strength since the Independence era, has ironically turned into a reputation for
communal and ‘vote-bank’ politics. The BJP in 2014 was also not easily categorized as
mainly a religious-nationalist party, mostly due to the efforts of its prime ministerial
candidate to portray the party as the harbinger of economic growth and progressive
change. This is the historical context within which Modi rose to leadership, a fact that had a
crucial role in securing his victory.
Split from BJP’s old order
On September 13, 2013, Narendra Modi was formally announced as BJP’s prime
ministerial candidate. The party’s parliamentary board, its primary decision making body,
was mostly in favor of this choice, with one notable exception. Political veteran and the preeminent face of the BJP party of the last several years, Mr. Lal Krishna Advani, staunchly
opposed the selection of Modi as the prime ministerial candidate. Almost concurrently with
the party’s announcement that Modi would be the leader of its campaign, Advani released a
blunt letter that contained harsh criticism of the decision. In this letter, Advani stated that
he was “anguished” by the decisions that BJP’s president Rajnath Singh was taking
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regarding the party’s direction and refused to attend the parliamentary board meeting or
endorse Mr. Modi as the candidate.48
The split between Advani and the other leaders of the BJP created quite a furor in
the media. Advani was widely viewed as the “patriarch” of the BJP and speculation ran
abound as to how the BJP was going to appease Advani. It was suggested that the party
would set up two campaign committees, one headed by Modi and the other by Advani.49
Ultimately, the BJP leadership was never fully able to bring Advani on board and his harsh
letter on September 13th pretty effectively closed the door on any efforts to unite the BJP’s
old leader with the newly anointed one. Such a spectacular and controversial beginning
was apropos of the campaign that was to follow. By coming to power within his party in a
manner that was openly in conflict with the established party machine, Modi was able to
launch a campaign that was ‘free of the baggage’, so to speak, that the BJP had carried
under its old leadership.
Advani’s involvement with the RSS and the larger umbrella of Hindu-nationalist
politics harkened back to the years just after Independence when religious divides were
particularly pronounced. His family migrated to India from what is now Pakistan during
Partition.50 He began his political career as a volunteer for the RSS in the Indian state of
Rajasthan. In 1980, Advani became a founding member of the Bharatiya Janata Party along
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with Atal Bihari Vijpayee and was appointed as the party’s general secretary.51 Thus,
Advani is an integral part of the BJP’s image and role in modern Indian politics.
Advani is also closely associated with the other infamous religious riots to have
occurred in recent times, which followed the destruction of the Babri Masjid mosque in
1990 in Ayodhaya, Uttar Pradesh. This incident occurred during a time when the Bharatiya
Janata Party was part of the National Front Coalition government at the center following
another historic defeat of the INC, a fact that had made Hindu militants bolder than ever.
Advani was one of the foremost leaders of the Hindu militant movement to destroy the
Babri Masjid, or the Babri Mosque, in order to build a temple on that site to commemorate
the fact that Hindus considered the city of Ayodhya to be the birthplace of their God, Ram.
He had organized and led a 2500-km march, or “yatra,” to Ayodhya, and was in fact
arrested for his role in inciting religious violence that resulted in the death nationwide of
over a hundred Hindus and Muslims.52
Although Modi and Advani were both embroiled in allegations that they were Hindu
extremists, the effect that these allegations had on the two men is vastly different. The
Hindu pilgrims who were killed in the train fire in 2002 were travelling to the site of the
former Babri-Masjid to help build this Ram temple, thereby making the 2002 riots almost a
continuation of the incident in 1990. In effect, Modi was accused of furthering the same
extremist cause in 2002 that Advani was accused of championing in 1990. However, Modi
retained deniability on the allegations that he encouraged the 2002 riots and was in fact reelected as Chief Minister with a landslide margin. In fact, his re-election platform focused
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heavily on placing the blame for the riots on radical Islamic activists.53 Advani, on the other
hand, was clearly implicated in the religious violence in 1990.
Although Advani attempted to temper the fallout from the Ayodhya riots by stating
that he regretted the demolition of the mosque, his reputation as a Hindu-nationalist
hardliner has remained.54 He has remained a prominent leader of the BJP, but he only ever
rose to the rank of Deputy Prime Minister when the BJP next came to power through the
National Democratic Alliance (NDA) coalition in 1998. Following the retirement of the
NDA’s leader and the well-known moderate, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, who had been India’s
Prime Minister from 1998 to 2004, Advani was unable to lead the NDA to victory in the
general elections of 2004, which incidentally also resulted in the formation of the UPA
coalition that would eventually be ousted by the Modi campaign in 2014.
As such, Modi’s split from the Advani-faction of the BJP was of no little significance.
When Mr. Advani finally resigned from all party posts in a letter to the party president, he
made it clear that the split between him and those who backed Modi as the new face of the
BJP was ideological in nature. Specifically, he was of the view that the BJP under Modi was
set to take a different ideological approach from the one that he and the other original
leaders of the party had espoused. Unfortunately for Mr. Advani, the fact that the BJP was
likely turning away from its old ideology was perhaps welcome news to India’s electorate,
which has broadly favored secularism over religious nationalism, as is apparent from the
success that the INC has enjoyed historically using the secular agenda.
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Modi’s leadership of a new BJP
Media coverage of the divide within the BJP clearly picks up on the significance of
Modi’s disassociation from the party’s old Vajpayee-Advani order since the split gave Modi
a blank slate on which to present the new BJP brand. In an opinion piece in one of India’s
leading newspapers, the Times of India, popular columnist Ashok Malik wrote, that “the
party [BJP] had outgrown identity politics and the RSS umbrella” and that, “it needed to
carve a new agenda.” He went on to observe that after an “ugly” reelection to Chief
Minister-ship in 2002, Modi had changed tack in Gujarat, transforming the narrative of his
administration from one of Hindutva to “one of Gujarati pride, of economic hope and social
aspiration, of growth and prosperity.” Mr. Malik concluded his observations by saying that
Modi’s ability to transform the narrative in Gujarat away from Hindutva and towards
progress had the potential to help the BJP sell that same dream to all of India.55
Modi was indeed able to revitalize the BJP agenda in this manner. But the fact
remained that he had forcibly pushed Advani out of the party’s leadership, an act that
reverberated through the months of campaigning. It was proof that Modi had taken
complete charge of the BJP and any opposition within the party would not be tolerated,
even if it came from party stalwarts. There may have initially been a split in the BJP’s
leadership. However, by the time the campaign was in full swing the BJP as whole threw its
weight behind Modi and the candidate gained a reputation for uniting the party under a
new leader.
If there were concerns about Modi’s authoritarian tendencies, the campaign
dismissed them in the same way that it dealt with all other criticism – it rebranded a
Ashok Malik, "Modify or Perish," The Times of India, June 8, 2013,
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negative into a positive. In an interview in July 2013, Modi countered criticism of his
leadership style by saying, "A leader who doesn't take a decision: who will accept him as a
leader? That is a quality, it's not a negative," and insisted that he had not run his
administration in an authoritarian manner, but only tried to lead an effective and efficient
team. In a move that would become characteristic of his campaign, Modi rebranded his
much-criticized management style as one in which a “decisive” leader made the best use of
a “team effort” by his administration.56
This approach was successful because of the political climate in which Modi was
pursuing it. As established in Chapter 2, the incumbent government had become paralyzed
and was being perceived as ineffective. For Indians who wanted economic growth, and who
wanted it now, a prohibitively strong-willed leader would have appeared to be a natural
choice. In an article written just after Modi was elected, The Economist refers to Modi as
“India’s Strongman” and notes the mood in the country by referring to a joke that, “until
last week India had no government, now it has no opposition.”57 The implication here is
that Modi exerts such strong control over Indian government that there can’t be any
credible opposition that is very successful against him. The same article, however, talks
about how this development in Indian government is a positive one. Having the mandate of
a victory by outright majority, combined with Modi’s “personal power” may make this
prime minister the most effective one in India’s recent history.58
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Chapter 4: Modi’s Campaign Strategy
The UPA government’s policy paralysis was an external factor that greatly benefited
the Modi campaign. The split from the BJP’s old order and Modi’s subsequent rise as a
powerful leader was well-orchestrated by his campaign but ultimately, that factor owed its
success as much to Modi’s strategy as it did to the historic Indian political context within
which these elections occurred. So far, it is clear why the incumbent government lost favor
with the electorate and how Modi’s BJP emerged as the preferable alternative, therefore
explaining why the BJP won. The sheer resounding scale of the BJP’s landslide victory in
2014, however, can only be explained by looking at the Modi campaign’s brilliant
management of the media. By turning the elections into a presidential-style contest and
also by successfully focusing the discourse on Modi’s economic track record, the campaign
was able to take Modi from being a controversial regional politician to a sensational
national politician who could command such a landslide victory.
A Presidential-Style Campaign
One consequence of Modi’s dramatic ascent to the top of the BJP hierarchy was that
the election became more about the candidate than about the party. This is somewhat
unusual in Indian politics, since elections are most often a contest between two or more
competing parties, and not personalities. The pre-eminent candidate within each party who
is expected to be the prime minister in case of victory is well known to the electorate.
However, the position of prime minister is one to which one member of the winning party
or coalition is selected by their party or coalition and appointed by the President after the
election, once that party or coalition has proven to the President of the country that it has
enough seats to constitute a majority in the parliament. As such, each party or coalition
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usually pitches its platform and ideology against that of the other, rather than directly
contrasting candidates with each other.
Modi’s campaign, on the other hand, more closely resembled the campaign for the
presidency in the United States. Modi acted as the face of all of BJP and was meticulous
about reaching out to all parts of the country, instead of simply focusing on the BJP’s strong
constituencies and allowing BJP’s regional allies to handle the campaign in the other areas.
For example, Modi’s campaign website was enabled to be translated into one of several
Indian languages and even some foreign languages.59 This shows the wide-reaching and
inclusive nature of the campaign. By contrast, the INC’s website still only shows the
capability to be translated into three languages. This was an important note to strike in a
country such as India, which in recent years has come to be dominated by regional parties.
The Economic Times, in its analysis of Modi’s campaign, notes that Modi behaved
much like an effective CEO. He was the sole link between “'the organisation' (BJP, RSS) and
'outside' (electorate, partners).”60 Particularly within the context of the incumbent
government’s failures, Modi’s ability to manage his party as a strong executive was very
useful to his candidacy. Instead of votes for the party being translated into a Prime
Minister-ship for Modi, the 2014 election was about votes for Modi translating into votes
for a BJP government.
This strategy was particularly effective when placed in contrast with the one
adopted by the Congress campaign. Rahul Gandhi, heir to the Gandhi political dynasty and
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the son of the party chair, Sonia Gandhi, was the party’s nominee for the office of the Prime
Minister. Although the INC was in power at the center, the party’s current Prime Minister
was Dr. Manmohan Singh, who had served for ten years in that office. So, the INC was also
in need of some rebranding given this key change in the party’s platform.
However, Rahul Gandhi proved to be far less effective in presenting his party as a
united front to the electorate than Modi was with the BJP. Although both candidates were
products of their respective party’s political history, their individual personal histories
were very much part of the political discourse in the period leading up to the election. The
contrast between Modi’s self-made image and Rahul Gandhi’s image as a Cambridgeeducated scion of the powerful Gandhi family could not have been clearer.
Mr. Modi was born into the Ghanchi community, which is categorized as an Other
Backward Class (OBC) under Indian law, a category that encapsulates a number of castes
that are determined to have been negatively affected by India’s rigid caste system.61 It is
now well known that he became involved in politics at the grassroots level as a volunteer
for the RSS, joined the BJP when he was thirty seven years old, and worked his way up the
ranks of the BJP by showing an extraordinary ability to handle the crisis of an earthquake
in his home state of Gujarat in 2001.62 During campaign season, the nickname of ‘Chaiwala,’
one that was alternatively considered positive by some and negative by others was
developed for Modi. ‘Chaiwala’ means ‘tea-seller’ in the Indian language of Hindi. When
Modi was a young boy, he sold tea with his brother at a railway platform in India.63 The
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‘chaiwala’ is an ubiquitous feature of Indian railway systems and this little detail of Modi’s
background not only increased his reliability but also emphasized his dramatic rise to
power.
Rahul Gandhi, on the other hand was born into a political dynasty that has been at
the center of Indian politics since well before independence. Rahul Gandhi was the son of
former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and his Italian-Indian wife, Sonia Gandhi. His was also
the grandson of Indira Gandhi, another former prime minister and the great grandson of
Jawaharlal Nehru, who was no less than India’s first ever prime minister. To say that his
eventual rise to the position of the INC’s prime ministerial-candidate was universally
expected would be an understatement. His imminent rise to power quite easily contrasted
with the way Modi had climbed the ranks through his own efforts, and the Modi campaign
took full advantage of that fact.
Modi engaged in a systematic effort to discredit Gandhi’s credentials to hold the
office of the prime minster by primarily targeting the latter’s ancestry. On the campaign
trail, Modi took to calling Gandhi, ‘Shehzada,’ which means ‘prince’ or quite literally, the
‘son of a Shah’.64 The implications of the word cannot be missed. On the surface, it referred
to the fact that Rahul Gandhi had been born into what was perhaps the most politically
powerful family in India. Further, the word ‘Shah’ originally referred to the Muslims kings
of India during the Mughal period. In another barb at the INC’s candidate, Modi once
mockingly congratulated mosquitoes for “daring to bite” the scion of the Gandhi family,
with the implication being that the INC’s candidate was usually given special treatment due
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to his family’s power.65 While such rhetoric was clearly inflammatory and designed to
provoke a strong populist reaction against Rahul Gandhi, the fact remained that it worked.
The INC was ill-equipped to engage in a battle of barbs and paid the price when the
electorate ceased to take its candidate as seriously as it did Modi.
It wasn’t so much that Rahul Gandhi failed to match Modi at his own game. Rather,
Rahul Gandhi and the INC consciously made the choice to run a campaign that stressed,
“party, over personality.”66 The INC, in a decision that was symbolic of its image as the
traditional status quo of Indian politics, decided to run the same traditional campaign that it
had run over the past several decades. The party and its regional allies approached the
election on multiple fronts. This strategy may have worked if the party’s candidate for
Prime Minister had at least acted as the glue between these multiple fronts but
unfortunately, Rahul Gandhi possessed neither the charisma nor the political clout to
assume such a role. Ultimately, Modi’s innovative (for India) presidential-style campaign
strategy proved to be the more successful one, particularly because it was run against an
incumbent government that had come to be perceived as stagnant and paralyzed.
As such, Modi’s spectacular rise as the leader of the BJP had the dual effect of
presenting him as an effective and appealing leader, and also turning the campaign into a
presidential-style contest that his opponent, Rahul Gandhi, was ill-equipped to handle. This
strategy was a way for Modi to present an alternative to the traditional approach adopted
by the INC. Unlike Rahul Gandhi, whose qualifications to be prime minister arose primarily
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from his family’s strong hold on the INC’s leadership, Modi had relied on his own track
record to present his candidacy and ensured that the electorate knew that he had done so.
This kind of candidate-focused politics is somewhat unusual in Indian politics, particularly
in recent years, and the Modi campaign executed it to great success.
Changing the Discourse
When Modi was announced as the leader of the BJP’s 2014 campaign and its
intended candidate for the office of Prime Minister, a group of leading academics and
intellectuals of Indian origin published an open letter in the British newspaper The
Independent. This letter was titled, “The Idea of Modi as Prime Minister Fills Us with Dread”
and was signed by academics from such universities as the London School of Economics
and the University of Cambridge.67 In another open letter to The Guardian, artists and
academics such as Salman Rushdie and Anish Kapoor expressed their belief that a Modi
victory would, “bode ill for India’s future as a country that cherishes the ideals of inclusion
and protection for all its peoples and communities.”68
Modi was notorious in the international political community, particularly for his
dispute with the United States government. In 2005, the US imposed a visa ban on Modi for
his alleged role in the 2002 riots.69 In 2013, Modi was invited to speak at the Wharton India
Economic Forum (WIFE) at the University of Pennsylvania regarding his economic growth
model in Gujarat, an invitation that WIEF withdrew at the last minute in the face of
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opposition from some of its professors.70 Modi’s US visa ban stayed in place through most
of 2014. However, just one short year later, In Time magazine’s 2015 list of the world’s 100
most influential people, US president Barack Obama was the author of Modi’s profile blurb,
where he praises the Indian politician as “India’s Reformer-in-Chief.”71 The Time profile
was a sign of a dramatically reversed reception of Modi by not only the US and other
international governments, but also by foreign media.
This dramatic change in the media and international political reception of Modi is in
great part thanks to the brilliant strategy his campaign adopted, in which it sought to
‘change the discourse.’ The notion behind this strategy is best explained in the words of the
world’s most famous fictional ad man Don Draper, who said, “If you don’t like what is being
said, change the conversation.”72 This is exactly what Modi did, by turning the focus away
from his troubled and controversial past with regards to religious riots and towards his
well-documented success in transforming his home state of Gujarat into an economic
powerhouse.
There is certainly truth behind Modi’s image as the architect of Gujarat’s economic
prosperity. Jyoti Thottam writes in a Time International article about Modi’s meteoric rise,
“Gujarat's $85 billion economy may not be the largest in India, but it has prospered
without the benefit of natural resources, fertile farmland, a big population center
like Mumbai or a lucrative high-tech hub like Bangalore. Gujarat's success,
even Modi's detractors acknowledge, is a result of good planning--exactly what so
much of India lacks.”73
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However, what makes Modi unique amongst all the other Chief Ministers across
India who have also brought economic growth to their respective states, is his ability to
capitalize on high profile instances of his success. He has effectively made his brand
synonymous with economic growth fueled by neoliberal policies.
That the Modi campaign adopted this strategy deliberately and completely selfconsciously is apparent. A 2002 New York Times interview with Narendra Modi provides
insight into why his campaign for India’s most powerful office made managing the media
discourse a priority. When asked if he regretted anything about how he had handled the
2002 riots, the then Chief Minister had replied that his “only regret” was that “he did not
handle the news media better.”74 While that reply may appear callous at first glance, it is
also undeniably the mark of highly media-savvy politician. Modi’s understanding of the
importance of directing the political discourse in the media was perhaps his greatest
advantage during 2014 election campaign.
The Modi campaign’s focus on managing the media did not stop with news outlets.
Modi is one of the most active politicians on social media platforms, most notably Twitter
where he has 11.9 million followers as of April 27, 2015, making him far and away the most
popular Indian politician on social media platforms.75 In fact, Modi’s popularity on Twitter
is second only to another populist politician, US President Barack Obama.76 Needless to say,
Modi’s social media presence was particularly impressive in a country where people
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between the ages of 21 and 44 make up 36.3% of the population, second in significance
only to the population under age 21, who make up 47.9% of the country.77
Modi’s savvy management of social media, as well as the fact that he firmly
established himself as the bringer of economic progress to Gujarat, had a curious effect on
the Indian political discourse, particularly in terms of its impact on the middle class and
private interests. In the face of his overwhelming popularity and association with
modernity and progress, debates over whether or not he was a radical Hindu nationalist
appeared petty and quarrelsome. This notion was promoted by the Modi campaign itself,
which reached out to the Muslim community under the banner of a united India for
economic progress.
In an address to predominantly Muslim audience in Uttar Pradesh, Modi stated, “We
(the BJP) believe in economic development, while you play the politics of votes, letting
Muslims languish in poverty.”78 The effect that this had on the country’s Muslims was
palpable. In an Al Jazeera profile of a cross-section of Indian Muslims, one young Indian
Muslim states, “holding grudges against the country's candidate for PM, who has been
given a clean chit in the court [referring to the Supreme Court-appointed Special
Investigations Team’s report clearing Modi of all charges], would just be a huge loss - not
just for the BJP - but for us - India's Muslims.”79 The young Muslim’s opinion is in the
minority compared to all the Muslims surveyed by Al Jazeera. However, his words perfectly
frame the argument that Modi was presenting to Muslim electorate in the country. Even if it
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did not convince all Indian Muslims, it was certainly appealing to enough of them to make a
difference. This is symptomatic of the Modi campaign’s genius in discrediting criticism. The
campaign’s successful framing of Modi’s past within the context of his economic success
managed to turn weakness into strength.
Further, the campaign implemented this strategy by attacking the economic policies
of the INC, particularly on entitlement programs and other left-leaning policies that
burdened businesses with British-era regulations. This criticism proved to be particularly
effective on the massive Indian middle class, and emerging private interests, both domestic
and foreign. This is in direct contrast to the INC’s political strategy that has historically
counted on the “lower social orders as its most important voting bloc.”80 An October 2011
article in the New York Times profiles the emerging middle class in India, declaring that the
middle class was the “fastest growing demographic group” in the country, one that
appeared to be shedding its traditionally characteristic political apathy. The article goes on
to observe that the new middle class is “tightly wedded to the private sector” and its
interests are not exactly aligned with the rural masses that have traditionally dominated
Indian elections and kept the INC in power.81
Modi’s attempt to influence the political discourse was thus successful because of
two reasons. First, Modi proved to be an extremely media-savvy politician, particularly
when it came to embracing social media platforms such as Twitter. Second, he offered the
Indian electorate a sufficiently engaging alternative topic of conversation i.e., economic
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development. Not to mention, Modi’s charismatic media presence also had the effect of
making him more ‘likeable’ and less apt to be characterized as the villain who had
masterminded a religious pogrom in his home state. As a result, the one issue that could
have stopped the Modi campaign in its tracks, i.e., his association with Hindu nationalism,
took a backseat to his image as the bringer of economic growth and prosperity.
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Chapter 5: Conclusions
This thesis has tried to address the question of whether Narendra Modi’s victory in
the Indian general elections of 2014 indicated that Hindu nationalism was starting to take
hold in India. In addressing this question, it is important to make the distinction between
what Modi may individually believe, and what his campaign presented to the nation. While
we cannot know with absolute certainty that Modi is not a Hindu extremist at heart, we can
certainly deduce from his campaign that he did not win the support of the Indian electorate
with religious nationalist sentiment. Modi’s brilliantly executed campaign in 2014 would
have been successful under any circumstances, but it had the added advantage of being
particularly adapted to the political and economic realties of India in the new millennium.
Given the reality of a gridlocked coalition government and a challenger who had a
proven track record of efficient government and superior economic performance, the
Indian electorate made the rather obvious choice of picking the challenger. The UPA
coalition had clearly become ‘paralyzed’ and was unable to pass significant reform
legislation. High-profile political scandals such as the ‘2G Spectrum’ scandal and the ‘Coalgate’ scandal dealt harsh blows to the INC’s image and caused divisions within the UPA
coalition. The government came across as disorganized and inefficient, and at a time when
the Indian people were growing impatient for faster economic growth à la China. In this
sense, the INC lost the 2014 election for the same reason that it has lost elections during
the 67 years since India gained independence. It’s own failures and mismanagement of its
image caused it to “lose” votes to the opposition.
The INC’s loss was exacerbated by the total contrast presented by Modi’s leadership
of the BJP. While the BJP is a natural alternative to the INC in Indian politics, Modi made his
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party a more palatable choice to secular India by breaking away from the old leadership. As
the leader of the newly rebranded BJP, Modi presented the BJP under his leadership as the
preferable alternative to the disorganized UPA coalition.
Further, the scale of Modi’s victory, i.e., his ability to “gain” votes from not only those
who were disillusioned with the INC but from a broad cross-section of Indians, is entirely
attributable to the unique strategies adopted by his campaign. It was a campaign that was
well managed from the top-down, and it acted as a perfect metaphor for the type of
administration that Modi’s platform promised to the electorate. It not only capitalized on
the UPA government’s failures but also presented a credible promise to lead India to a
better future.
It also brought new aspects to Indian electoral discourse, such as presidential-style
personality politics, and national (as opposed to communal) appeal. Modi’s individual
appeal translated into votes for the BJP, raising the appeal of the party throughout the
nation. Gandhi’s lack of appeal on the other hand, hurt the INC as a whole. This may have
long-term ramifications for politics in India, particularly to the INC. The INC has a long and
unbroken tradition of being chaired by a member of the Gandhi dynasty, all descendants of
India’s first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru. Perhaps that streak ends with Rahul Gandhi,
if he continues to be a weak match to Modi’s strong persona.
Finally, Modi’s campaign managed media discourse regarding his image to
perfection by directing the conversation away from his association to the 2002 riots and
towards his record of bringing economic development to Gujarat. While it is tempting to
dismiss Modi’s media strategy as a shallow attempt to disguise his controversial past, an
alternative argument can be made that Modi has truly learned his lessons from 2002 and
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that he has come to understand the pitfalls of communal politics. In a country such as India,
which despite its secular identity has long struggled with religious tensions, it is an
unfortunate truth that all of the major political parties have a history of engaging in politics
that seek to capitalize on religious tensions. As such, Modi’s campaign was notable for the
way it resisted the temptation to do so. This thesis ultimately seeks to emphasize that
Modi’s victory was not because of, but despite, his Hindu nationalist past.
In fact, Modi’s victory not only moves away from a religious-nationalist strategy, but
also potentially offers an alternative to the forced, and often hypocritical, secularism that
has been adopted by certain democracies. The new Modi administration moves away from
the INC’s insistence on maintaining an entirely non-religious image while continuing to
play communal politics. Instead openly embraces its Hindu identity while disassociating
that religious identity from the economic and social welfare of the country. This could be
very important for a nation such as India, which is highly religious at the individual level
(as evidenced by the continued existence of a rigid caste system), and yet seeks to maintain
secularism at the collective level (as evidenced by the repeated success of the INC’s secular
image in past elections).
Narendra Modi will have been in office for a year in May 2015. It is unclear whether
his promise of “Ache Din,” i.e., “Good Days,” has yet fully materialized. The country has yet
to see what the Modi administration’s response would be to a major religious conflict.
While Modi himself may have adopted a neutral tone in his public remarks about religion
and minorities, members of his administration continue to give indications that they may
not be very willing to protect the rights of minorities in the way that the INC has done in
the past. Modi’s Minister for minority affairs, Najma Heptulla, said at the very start of the
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administration that she was opposed to “reservations,” which is the term for affirmative
action-inspired quotas that have been set up in India for minorities, because they killed the
“spirit of competition,” and drove the point home harder by declaring that “Muslims are not
minorities.”82 Along the same vein, the Minister for social justice, Thawar Chand Gehlot said
that he believed the reservation system benefitting religious minorities was
“unconstitutional.”83 There is also the question of how involved the RSS, the BJP’s parent
organization, will be in Modi’s administration. The RSS continued to insist that India is a
“Hindu nation,” a notion that many in BJP are likely to still hold due to their close ties to
this organization.84 Although the fears that the Modi government will systematically target
Muslims and religious minorities are yet to materialize in any concrete way - the
reservation system is still in place, for example – it may yet be too soon to tell whether
religious minorities will suffer under this administration.
On the other hand, Modi certainly seems to be tackling the challenge of better
governance and neoliberal economic reform in India, the two key aspects of his platform.
For example, Modi announced plans to downsize the Planning Commission, a relic of the
Jawaharlal Nehru-led near-socialist era of Indian history.85 This is a measure that tackles
both fronts of Modi’s agenda – restricting government bodies to make them more efficient,
and implementing neoliberal economic policies, in this case, deregulation of the economy.
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Politicians on both ends of the spectrum have long criticized the Planning Commission for
“over-regulation of ministries and state governments.”86 This government, however, may
be the first since the post-Independence era to actually work on re-structuring the Planning
Commission to make it less powerful and over-arching. This may have the effect that Modi
intends, which is to remove regulatory burden on states so that they can attract
investment, or it may have the effect of derailing the economy due to less oversight. The
Modi administration would also have to address concerns over whether neoliberal policies
tend to worsen inequality and encourage risky behavior through less oversight of the
private sector, although these effects may not be apparent for several years to come.
A full evaluation of the Modi administration is thus not possible at this time, and we
cannot know whether Modi intends to follow through on his campaign’s promise of
focusing on economic development for all sections of the Indian population. We can
conclude with certainty, however, that the Modi campaign has fundamentally changed the
way politics are conducted in India. Historical assumptions about parties and personalities
no longer seem to hold sway in the way that they used to, at least when faced with as savvy
a campaign as the one run by Modi. This is in all likelihood a positive sign for India’s future,
as the country may now have the chance now to form a new national identity not restricted
by Independence-era thinking.
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